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REVIEW AND HARMONISATION OF FRAMEWORK OF
FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES FOR EFFECTIVE
ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA
CHIEF B. A. OKE
INTRODUCTION
Monetary policy generally refers to the combination ofmeasures designed to regulate
the value, the supply and cost of money in an economy in consonance with the expected
level of the economic activity. Excessive growth in money supply leads to high rates of
spending on domestic and foreign goods. Given that domestic supply is essentially inflexible
in the short n,m, excessive growth in money supply is likely to result in substantial inflationary
pressures in the economy. To the extent that spending pressures are directed towards
foreign goods (or assets) balance ofpayments pressure will ensue. The objective or task of
monetary policy is to ensure that the expansion in domestic liquidity is consistent with
government's objectives ofgrowth, inflation and the balance of payments.
Fiscal policy may be defined as the deliberate change oflevels of government
expenditures, taxes and borrowing in order to achieve such national economic goals as full
employment, price stability, growth in the GDP and balance ofpayments equilibrium. 1be
main instruments of fiscal Policy, are government taxes, expenditure and borrowing.
Borrowing is a supplementary instrument offiscal policy when fiscal operations result in a
deficit. Thus deficit financing implies that the taxes that are generated compulsorily from the
citizens are not sufficient to meet the expenditure programme ofthe government.
Considering that fiscal and monetary policies have the same objective and are
designed within the same broad national economic policy framework, the harmonisation of
both policies for effective economic management seems quite natural, logical and simple.
However, experience in the past two decades have shown that the Nigerian economy has
been mismanaged. (SeeOjoM 0. 1995 p2). Particularly. thepoorperformanceofmonetary
1.
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JX>licy has been attributed to the lack ofco-ordination or hannonization with fiscal JX>licy.
The objective of this paper, therefore, is to review the framework ofmonetary and fiscal
JX>licies with a view to forging a framework for harmonising them for effective economic
management. The rest of the paper is divided into six parts. Part 2 is a theoretical overview
of some fiscal policy concepts, especially those related to fiscal deficit size and financing.
Part 3 examines the mac.roeconomic policy framework which forms the common basis for
the design of fiscal and monetary policies. Parts 4 and 5 analyse in greater details the
framework for fiscal policy and monetary policy, respectively. Part 6 is a critical review of
the lack of fiscal and monetary policy harmonisation in Nigeria. Part 7 is a harmonised
framework of fiscal and monetary policies for effective economic management in Nigeria

2.

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF SOME FISCAL POLICY
CONCEPTS

In the context ofharmonisation of fiscal and monetary policies in Nigeria, particular
I
importance attaches to size of the budget deficit, the relationships between budget deficits
and the external current account balance and those between the methods of financing
deficits and other stabilisation objectives.

Size of Budget Deficit.
Consideration ofthe appropriateness ofthe fiscal policy stance often focuses on
the size of budget deficits. Such deficits provide a measure of the excess of government
spending over its revenue, and as such an indication of budgetary addition to domestic
demand. When fiscal deficit is large and interest rates are positive, the share of public
expenditure d~voted to financing debt will also increase. In other words, fiscal deficit will
in time, feed upon itselfthrough the interest rate component of public expenditure. For this
reason, it is considered prudent to pursue the parallel objective ofremoval of financial
repression and reduction iR the size of the deficit. Fiscal deficit can be reduced by cutting
expenditure or by raising revenue.

The Budget and External Balance
Some linkages exist between the budget deficit and the external sector as indicated below.
1.
2.

CA = Y - A .......... ..... ....... .... ( 1)
~FA = CA+ ~Fl.. ......... .. .. (2)
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Where:

y
A
CA

=

!1NFA=
!1FI
•

=

Gross National Income
Domestic Absorption or Total Do mestic Demand
C urrent Account Balance
Change in Net Foreign Asset
Net Capital Flows

Equation ( 1) says that the gap between production and absorption is equal to the
current account balance while Y-A = Export-Import indicating that an improvement
in the current account ba lance requires either an increase in output o r a reduction
expenditure.

•

Equation (2) is the balance o f payment identity. Any excess of absorptio n over
income as reflected in the current account deficit, must be financed either by capital
inflow or a draw- down on reserves.

Sources Of Deficit Financing
The way ill'which a fiscal deficit is financed determines to a large extent the impact
that it w ill have on the economy. For analytical purpose, the financing ofthe deficit can be
dis tinguished in different ways, all important, but emphasizing different aspect. One can
distinguish between domestic and foreign. iriflationary and non-inflationary, and voluntary
and compulsory financing.

Foreign Financing
If a country can fi na nce its fiscal deficit throug h foreign grants (or through
concessio nary loans with a lo ng maturity period, then the deficit may not have detrimental
implication for the economy. Especially ifthe deficit is associated with productive uses of
resources. it will bring substantial benefits to the economy.
The second most attractive foreign source of financing deficit is provided by loans
with long maturity (say over 10 years) tied to project(s) that pass a relevant cost-benefit
criterion.
Foreign borrowing may raise the level of gross foreign exchange reserves, but it
will tend to deplete net ofowned reserves. That is, foreign borrowing will, in the short-run,
have positive effect on the overall balance of payments performance, but not necessarily
on the current account. M oreover, external financing of fiscal deficits has implication for
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the longer-ten:n external performance of the country by increasing external indebtedness
and. therefore. by raising the burden offuturc debt service.
Non-Inflationary Domestic Financing
Non-inflationary financing is non1ially associated with the sale of bonds to the
public. The extent to which this source of financing is possible depends on two
considerations.
(i)
The size and sophistication o_fthe country's capital market.
(ii)
l11e interest rate policy being pursued; the possibility offinancing substantial share
of its fiscal deficit through domestic sale of bonds is not compatible with policies of
financial repression, regardless ofthe size and financial sophistication ofthe market.
In such a situation savers will buy goods or will try to invest their financial assets
abroad, thus reducing the capacity ofgovernment to finance its fiscal deficit, while
at the same time aggravating the BOP problem (see Tanzi and Bleger 1982).
Other non-inflationary ways in which the government can finance its deficit include
some compulsory means of which two would be mentioned.
(i)
Sales of bonds to social security institutions and other pension funds. Often these
institutions are required by law to buy public bonds at negative interest rates. To
the extent that the rates are negative amounts to a tax o n-the institution. If the
institution runs deficits that must be financed by Government budget - what
government gains on the one hand it losses on the other.
(ii)
The second compulsory non-inflationary financing is the building up ofarrears i.e.
government purchases of goods and services are not paid for on time. When the
arrears are created against the private sector. no money creation takes place - it is
as if the private sector had bought government bonds at zero interest rate for the
period until payment is made. The practice encourages the inflation of contract
prices etc. Ifan arrears is accumulated against a public enterprise. it will run deficits
or higher deficits linked either directly or indirectly by government and create
inflationary pressures. A well co-ordinated fiscal policy would therefore guard
against the accumulation of arrears. Thus accumulation of arrears are considered
a particularly unfortunate means of budgetary finance. Such arrears have similar
macroeconomic conseque nces as other forms of public borrowing. as well as
jeopardising future financing integrity ofthe budgetary system
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Inflationary Finance: Deficit And Money Creation
The fiscal deficit acquires particular importance when it increases the money supply.
1be majOFconnection between the fiscal deficit, inflation and the balance of payments
comes from the effect that the deficit is likely to have on money creation. The connection
between financing ofthe deficit and monetary expansion (normally referred to as inflationary
finance) comes about when the Government sells bonds directly to the Central Bank.
Reliance on commercial banks' finance may be expected to have similar effects if banks
are not forced to constrain credit to other borrowers.
The most negative effect on the BOP, as measured by the impact on the level of
international reserves, is likely to arise from fiscal expansion financed by direct borrowing
from the Central bank. Since this mechanism implies, in general, an increase in the money
supply, it tends to create excess liquidity in the hands of the public. Such excess liquidity
will tend to increase demand for domestic and foreign goods, as well as for alternative
financial assets, including foreign assets, and will therefore tend to put pressure on prices

and on the BOP.
This is the well known mechani9ffi of adjustment postulated by the monetary
approach to the balance ofpayments and implies that the excess supply ofmoney created
by the monetiz.ation ofthe deficit would only be eliminated as foreign exchange reserves
have been depleted enough to restore equilibrium in the money market. In addition the
pressure put by excess liquidity on the level ofprices has an additional equilibrating effect
by reducing the real value ofthe outstanding stock ofmoney.
In an economy operating under a fixed exchange rate system, the more open is the
economy (the higher the share oftraded goods in total_expenditure) the larger will be the
role ofthe balance ofpayments., adjustment in the equilibrium process, and, therefore, the
larger the losses of reserves and the less the impact of monetised deficits on domestic
prices. Ifthe exchange rate is allowed to adjust, the monetiz.ation offiscal deficits will put
upward pressure on the exchang!,! rate, reducing the losses ofreserves and increasing the
inflationary impact. In the limit, with a fully flexible exchange rate operating through changes
in the price level, the level of international reserves will clearly be affected much less in this
case.
The monetary impact of central bank expansion of domestic credit to finance
public sector deficit can be reduced by adoption vf sterilisation measure and other types
ofcontractionary monetary policies.
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Equivalent contraction in credit to the private sector through changes in reserve
requirements or through the imposition of other restrictions on the ability ofthe
banking system to expand lending.
If interest rates are market determined, it will tend to push up the levels of interest
rates and will lead to the well k.n0wn "crowding out effect". The stronger the
crowding out effect, the lesser will be the balance ofpayments impart of Central
Bank financing ofpublic sector deficit. Thus, in financing larger deficits through the
Central Bank, the authorities are confronted with the trade-off between
compromising the achievement of monetary target, with the consequent BOP and
inflationary results, and constraining the financing of the private sector, with the
ensuring effects on economic activity and investment.

3.

THE MACROECONOMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK
In Nigeria, as in most market economies, the design ofmonetary and fiscal policy
is done within the context of the overall economic programme of the country. Such a
programme typically defines the main objectives in terms ofreal growth in GDP, infl~tion
rate and balance of payments. To achieve the objectives, the authorities implement a set of
fiscal, monetary, economic and structural policies. This comprehensive system of policy
formulation relies on the techniques ofFinancial Programming.
A prerequisite of the Financial Programme is the preparation of major sector
accounts; including National Product (GDP), Federal Government Budget, Monetary Sector
and the Balance ofPayments.
These sectoral accounts would be used for:
1.
A review and assessment of recent economic developments;
11.
Determination and quantification of appropriate policy objectives such as the GDP
growth rate, inflation rate, Federal Government budget deficit or sw-plus an·d the
rn.

balance of payments;
The determination and quantification of a co-ordinated set ofpolicy instruments to
achieve the set targets.
Three of the tables are shown in simplified form on the. next page.
The aim ofmonetary and fiscal policy is to reduct or eliminate disequilibra in the

BOP and/or inflation. However inflation and BOP difficulties are often a symptom rather
than basic causes ofeconomic disequilibrwn. Consequently, policies should be aimed at

Oke 58

eliminating the basic causes ofdisequilibrum. Often the basic causes ofinflation or external
imbalance has been excessive monetary expansion.
Monetary expansion brings about changes in relative prices, thus encouraging
imports, discouraging exports, and inducing unfavourable capital movements. Monetary
expansion is itself promoted by other factors and in recent years the culprit in many
'developing countries including Nigeria, has been large fiscal deficits.
Considerable attention is therefore being paid to the size of the fiscal deficit and
the mode offinancing the deficit. Consequently economic policy framework sets.quantitative
performance targets related to
(i)
The size ofthe fiscal deficit in nominal terms;
(ii)
Aggregate Domestic Bank Credit expansion and,
(iii)
Sub-ceiling on bank credit to government

BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS BOP
Current Account (X,I)
+Capital Account
=Change in NFA
NFA
NCG
NOA
NOC
OAN
M2

=
=
=
=
=
=

GOVEAAMENT
BUDGET
Revenue
- Expenditure
=Change in NCG

MONETARY SURVEY
NFA+NDA=M2
Or
NFA+NDC+OAN = M 2

Net Foreign Assets
Net Credit to Government
NetDomesticAssets
Net Credit to the Domestic Economy
Other Assets (Net)
Money Supply (Currency outside banks+ deposits)

X
=
Exports
I
=
Imports
Note that the three tables are closely linked
The outcome of both the BOP (~FA) and Government Budget (t1NCG)
•
•

influence the monetary survey.
Growth and prices influence the BOP and Government Budget. Similarly, the
extent to which investment exceeds saving in the national income account is reflected
in an external current account deficit.
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•

The Monetary Survey is a consolidation ofthe balance sheet of the Central Bank
and the Deposit Money Ban.ks (DMBs).

4.

FISCAL PLANNING AND BUDGETARY FRAMEWORK
The Fiscal Planning and Budgeting Cycle: includes important activities such
as designing a macroeconomic framework, collating the sectoral budget into a single national
budget, monitoring the implementation ofthe budget and evaluating results. In this light the
main agencies involved with planning and budgeting cycle include the Federal Ministry of
Finance (F.M.F) office of Accountant General of the Federation (AGF), the National
Planning Commission (NPC) the Presidency; the office of the Auditor-General of the
Federation (AuGF) and several inter-ministerial committees.
Planning: There are three main levels ofplanning. The first determines the overall
strategies offhe Federal Government (FG) with regard to the conduct of macroeconomic
policy and the prov ision of government services. The second function is aimed at how
much f G W can afford to spend in total and how that spending should be financed. This
aspect of fiscal policy is intimately related to the overall macroeconomic management of
the economy. This is accomplished by means ofmacroeconomic projections. For example,
forecasts for oil exports, imports, exchange rates and GDP are excellent guides to expected
federally collected revenues- Federally retained revenues plus borrowing less principal
and interest due, should equal the resources available for spending. The third planning
function is aimed at deciding how much should be spent on each sector, ministry, agency.
programme or project. This provides the foundation for the annual budget.
The budget cycle starts in July, when the Federal Government makes an assessment
ofits current fiscal po$ition and begins the process offormulating future policies. The NPC
establishes the overall macroeconomic framework in coordination with the FMF and the
C BN. Frequently, however. final policy decisions are not taken until November or
December.
The FMF and the NPC send out call circulars in August to each ministry soliciting
their detailed requests for funding in the next year. These circulars also offers general
guidance on expenditure priorities and policies. The negotiations between the ministries,
the FMF and the NPC take place in October to determine the preliminary recurrent and
capital allocations for the next year. The final proposals are vetted through the Ministerial
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Budget Committee wlnch includes Director Generals (DGs) the FMF Budget Department.
the AGF. the NPC, the CBN and the Presidency.
The final budget allocation proposals are presented to the Cabinet and then to the
Armed Forces Ruling Council for review along with a macroeconomic framework from
the NPC and proposals on foreign exchange and Monetary policy from the CBN. The
entire package is then brought to the office of the President for approval in November or
December. The results are announced in the form of a budget speech, usually in early
January. The final expenditure vote allocations are then used as the basis for system of
quarterly warrants autho~ised by the Minister of Finance which provide the authority to
incur expenditure (AIE) by budget head or sub-head. The line ministry officers for each
sub-head authorise expenditures while the tender boards approve contracts.
Under Parliamentary Democratic government, the Executive President (towards
the end of the year, e.g. November 1999) submits to the National Assembly an
Appropriation Bill indicating the revenue projection and expenditure proposal for the next
year (2000). The National Assembly in tum $Crutinizes the proposals through the various
Committees, and after a thorough de~ate, the Appropriation Bill is passed into Law as an
Act, It is only after the law is passed that the government can incur expenditure.
When the approved budget or the Appropriation Act is received at the FMF,
Budget Department, AIEs or Warrants are issued to Ministries, authorising them to incur
expenditure.
The approved budget is divided into three parts:
(i)
Revenues arranged by type
(ii)
Recurrent allocations arranged by ministry
(iii)
Capital expenditure arranged by sector.
The annual national rolling plan, first published in 1990, provides detailed
descriptions of the broad policies of the FG on a macroeconomic and on a sector by
sector basis. It also contains a rolling three-year capital investment plan on a project by
project basis with~ each sector. Ideally, the total allocations within the rolling plan should
match those ofthe budget.
The implementation ofthe budget is monitored on a monthly basis within the ministries
by the Finance and Supplies (F&S) Departments which keep monthly transcripts of all
receipts and expenditures. The F&S departments also reconcile these transcripts with
their monthly bank balances and then forward the result to the AGF. The AGF staffmonitor
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the data for breaches of authority to incur expenditure, provide reports to the FMF Budget
Otlice. the AuGF, the NPC, and the Presidency. The AGF also sends the final report for
the entire year to the AuGF. The AuGF then further reviews the data and prepares an
annual report on the final accounts ofthe FG. The Public Accounts Committee reviews
the annual reports of the AuGF as well as any case of financial or physical losses that may
be brought by the AuGF. Many of thl.!se monitoring and control mechanisms have
broken-down under the military and need to be re-established.

5.

FRAMEWORK FOR MONETARY POLICY
Within the macroeconomic policy framework already described, the role of the
Central Bank is to conduct appropriate monetary policy which is consistent with the national
objectives ofreal growth in GDP, inflation rate and the BOP. In his regard, the Central
Bank determines the demand for money consistent with the country's macroeconomic
objectives and manipulates the monetary policy instruments at its disposal in order to
equate money supply with demand. The ensuing money growth rate and other relevant
parameters become the monetary aggregate targets for the relevant period.
The Supply of Money
The use of policy instruments to affect monetary aggregates requires analysis
(understanding) of the money supply process. This analysis is facilitated by the use ofthe
accounting framework on page 12.
The Accounting Framework
The accounting framework is basically an analysis ofthe components ofthe money
supply which are on the liabilities side of the accounts and the factors affecting changes
(growth or reduction) in the money supply on the assets side.
•
The Central Bank or Monetary Authority Accounts: The liabilities of the
Central Bank include currency held outside banks and bank reserves which
together constitute Base Money or Reserve Money. Currency outside the banks
is a direct component of money supply, while the availability of bank reserves
affects the ability of deposit money banks to create deposits. Analysis ofthe assets
side of the balance sheet indicates the foreign ( or external) and domestic factors
affecting the growth of money and reserve money.
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•

•

Deposit Money Banks (DMBs): The DMB·s account is a summary of till·
activities offinancial institutions whose liabilities represent the deposit component
ofmoney supply. Assets ofthe DMBs include their reserves and their extension of
domestic credit.
The Monetary Survey: This is a combination or consolidation of the two other
accounts just considered. The liabilities of the monetary survey constitute Money
and Quasi money . The assets side consists of foreign and domestic assets which
are the factors affecting growth in the money supply.
Thus the monetary survey using the balance sheet identity is of the form:
M 2 = (M, + QM) =
NFA+NDC +OAN ........................... (3)
AM,= (AM + QM)= ANFA + ANDC + A OAN ........................... (4)
-

I

WhereM 2

=
=
Ml
QM
=
NFA =
NOC =
OAN =
=
A

•

money supply (broadly defined)
money supply (narrowly defined)
quasi-money or Time+ Savings deposit at DMBS
foreign assets (net)
aggregate domestic credit (n~t)
other assets (net)
change

Demand For Money
Given the projected growth in output, inflation rate and balance of payment i.e.
accretion to external reserves (ANF A) in the relevant future period. the Central Bank
determines the demand for money and bank credit consistent with po licy o bjectives.
A variety ofthe estimating techniques may be used depending on the availability of
data and the stability of the relationship between foe relevant variables e.g.
•
Sophisticated econometric models
•
Regression Analysis of the form:

63 CBN ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW VOL. 38 NO. 4

THE ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK FOR MONETARY ANALYSIS

The Central Bank
Assets
Foreign Assets
Claims on Central Government
Claims on DMBs
Other Assets

Liabilities
Base Money
- Currency Outside Banks
- Bank Reserves
Central Government Deposits
Other Liabilities

Deposit Money Banks (DMBs)
Assets
Reserves
-Vaults Cash
-Balances with Central Bank
Claims on Central Government
Claims on Private Sector
Other Assets

Liabilities
Demand Deposits
Savings Deposits
Time Deposits
Foreign Currency Deposits
Central Government Deposits
Credit From Central Bank
Other Liabilities

Monetary Survey
Assets
Foreign Assets (net) (NF A)
Domestic Credit (net) (NOC)
-Claims on Govt. (net) (NCG)
Claims on Private Sector (DCP)
Other Assets Net (OAN)

Liabilities
Money (M 1)
-Currency Outside Banks (Cp)
-Demand Deposits
Quasi Money (QM)
- Savings Deposits
-Time Deposits
-Foreign Currency Deposits
(M 1) +(QM) = M2
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Ln M 2 = a0 + a 1 LnTT + a 2 LnY + aJ Ln M2
p
p

.. . .......... . .................

(5)

t-1

I

Where
M
p 2

=

TT

=

Y
•

=

money supply (broadly defined r..½) deflated by the price level(P)

inflation rate or the opportunity cost ofholding money e.g. interest rate.
real gross domestic product.
A more judgemental approach would be to aSsess the demand for money on the
likely movement ofthe ratio ofmoney to nominal GDP or the velocity of money
which is the inverse ofthis ratio

Determination of Money Supply and Credit Targets
Given the computed values of money M2 , foreign assets (net) NFA and other
assets net OAN, the credit absorptive capacity ofthe economy, i.e., the change in aggregate
domestic credit (L1NDC), consistent with growth in real GDP, inflation rate and balance of
payments target (0rL\NFA) follows .from equation (2) such that:NDC
M 2-NFA-OAN........ ..............(6)
~NDC
~M2- ~NFA- ~OAN
(7)
The ensuing addition to aggregate domestic credit is then decomposed into changt..
in credit to Government (L'.lDCG) and change in credit to the private sector (MCP).
Having determined the level ofgovernment deficit to be financed by the banking system,
credit to the private sector is derived as a residual:~DCP
=
~NDC - illCG................ (8)
Thus, the illCP derived becomes the maximum amount of increase in credit to
be extended to the private sector during the relevant period, and the illCG becomes the
public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) on the banking system.
The Framework For Indirect Control
Since June 1993 when Open Market Operations (OMO) was introduced, the
framework for monetary control has been based largely but not solely on the relationship
between the money supply and the base money (monetary base or high-powered money).
The feasibility of controlling bank credit and hence money supply in this way hinges on the
principle that banks maintain a stable relationship1>etween their reserves (vault cash and
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deposit with Central Bank) and the amount of credit they extend, such that the credit
control can be achieved by controlling base money.

The Concept of Base Money
Base Money (B) is composed largely of:
(i)
(ii)

Currency with non bank public (Cp); and
Cash Reserves ofBanks (R) comprising vault cash and balances held
with central bank:

The main sources of base money (B) comprise
(i)

(ii')
(iii)

Net Central Bank Claims on Government (NCGCB)
Net Foreign Assets of the Central Bank (NFACB); and
Other Assets (net) of the Central Bank (OACB)

Thus, the balance sheet identity ofthe Central Bank can be written as:
NCGCB + NF ACB + OACB = C + R = B .................. (9)
p

The Concept of Money multiplier (in)
The concept of money multiplier derives from the idea that banks can and do
.expand money supply by a m11ltiple ofreserves available to them. This is exhibited
in the relation:
M 2 = m .B .................. , ... .............. (10)
From the monetary survey we saw that
M2 = CP + D .............................. (11) and from (9)
B = Cp + R .............. ................(12)
From ( 10), the multiplier may be derived as
m = M2 . .............. .. .... . . . ....... . ......... . ( 13)

B
Substituting the right hand side of(l 1) and (12) in (13) and dividing by D the
money multiplier can be defined in terms of ratios of currency and reserves to dcposi ts:
m = M 2/B=(C p+D)l(Cp +R) = (CpID+DIDY(C p/D+R/D) .. ............. (14)
or m

= 1 + c ........................................... ............................. ....... ........ ( 15)
c+r
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Where D= deposit held by banks;
c = ratio of currency to deposits:
r = ratio of bank reserves to deposits:
And all other variables are as previously defined.
Controlling the Money Supply
•
Calculate the level of Base money (B)consistent with the target for M2 in the
financial programme: B = M 2
m
•
Take into account factors affecting (B) outside Central Bank control.
•
The Central Bank can then estimate increases or decreases in the sour:ces of
B that it does control so as tQ hit the target by the use of OMO.
•
The multiplier (m) can be influenced through changes in reserve requirements and
interest rates.
•
If interest rates increase ratio (c) in equation ( 15) declines and (m) Increases.
•
Ifreserve requirements increase, (r) increases and (m) declines
•
The implication of this is that the Central Bank' s control over reserve money
is incomplete. For example, changes in NFA, which are a reflection of the balance
ofpayments outcome cannot generally be considered to be a policy-controlled
•

variable.
.
.
In countries where there is policy co-ordination or harmonisation between the
Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance, control can be effectively exercised
over net claims on Government but the experience in Nigeria has been that the
CBN adjusts passively to government's budgetary position.

6.

EXPERIENCE WITH MONETARY POLICY IN NIGERIA
We summarize below the experience ofNigeria with OMO to illustrate the absence
of harmonisation of fiscal and monetary policies. The 1990 decade in Nigeria was
characterized by severe economic instability. The major problems to which macroeconomic
po1icy measures were directed albeit unsuccessfully included internal imbalance reflected
in high and accelerating rate ofdomestic infl.ttion accompanied by falling private investment,
low output growth, reducti<"' ;" industrial capacity utilization; external imbalances reflected
in depreciating exchange rate, current account deficits, capital flight and high level ofexternal
indebtedness.
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A restrictive monetary policy stance was adopted and aimed at reducing the inflation
~ and contributing to exchange rate stability. Credit to the private sector was programmed
to expand moderately while credit to government was expected to drop substantially.
Since June 1993 the main technique for achieving the objectives ofmonetary policy has
been the use ofOMO, reinforced by changes in cash reserve requirements and discount
window operations.
Contrary to the restrictive stance of monetary policy since 1991, monetary
aggregates have grown phenomenally as a result ofthe larger than anticipated growth in
CBN credit to Government and C8N's passive adjustment to government's budgetary
position.
The rate ofinflation as measured by the CPI rose persistently from 44.6 percent in
1992 to a peak of 72.8 percent in 1995 declining to 29.3 percent in 1996 and 8.5 percent
in 1997 and edging up to l 0.2 percent in 1998. In tandem with high rates ofinflation, the
exchange rate depreciated from N9.9095 to the US$ l .Oto about N80 to N85 per US$
between 1996 and 1998 and then to about N 100 to the dollar in 1999. In spite of increased
liquidity, nominal interest rates rose phenomenally in line with inflation, but real rates remained
largely negative. Although external ~sets grew since 1996, reaching over US$7 billion in
1997 and 1998, the balance of payments pressure which resumed in 1992 persisted
throughout the 1990 decade.
The general reduction in the tempo ofeconomic activity continued to be reflected
in lower and declining trend in capacity utilization. The real GDP virtually stagnated or
grew at very low rates. Unemployment remained high. Social services, especially the health,
electricity, telecommunications, etc, came under intense pressure. Apart from the huge
cost ofproviding these services, there are wide-spread disruption in service delivery.
The situation was worsened by acute fuel shortages since 1997. The nutrition
status ofthe people is adjudged to have suffered declines as a result offood price increases.
Thus in spite of monetary policy measures, economic instability persisted.

Why Did Monetary Policy Fail?
•
The failure to sell the weekly primary a 1 1ction at true market rates is the most
important factor in the failure ofOMO to achieve monetary policy targets. This
was the result ofarbitrary government intervention from January 1994 to September
1998 when Treasury bills rate was administratively set at 12 to 12.5 percent.
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•

Secondly, the CBN' s practice of underwriting government securities sales to the
public at targeted interest rates deprives the CBN of control over its portfolio of
government securities and hence o.ver its credit to Government (net). OMO is
intended to overcome this loss of control, but as long as OMO is limited by the
same interest rate constraints, the CBN will not be able to control credit to
Government and hence Base money.

•

The inability ofthe CBN to control money supply was aggravated by government's
disregard for the limits on ways and means advances as well as the conditions for
repayment.
Persistently larger than anticipated government deficit was complicated by extra
budgetary expenditures, and the operation ofextra-legal accounts with implication
for transparency and accountability.
Prolonged unstable political and economic environment feeding back on each
other.
The deterioration in the general condition ofthe financial system as gauged by
capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings and quality ofmanagement.
For example at the expiration of the deadline of December 1998 for banks to
raise their minimum capital to N500 million, only 64 (41 out of51 Commercial
Banks, and 23 out of38 Merchant Banks) had fully complied.
Over 40 percent of total loans and advances of banks insured by NDIC are
classified as bad and doubtful.
Pervasive distress in the financial sector has impaired the systems responsiveness
to monetary policy changes. The number of distressed banks increased from 7 in
1989 to 50 in 1997. In spite ofthe liquidation of 14 Commercial and 16 Merchant
Banks in 1998, there were still as many as 22 distressed banks in the system at the
end of 1998 (CBN Annual Report 1998).

•

•
•

7.

FRAMEWORK FOR THE HARMONISATION OF FISCAL AND
MONET ARY POLICY FOR EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC
MANAGEMENT

The Nigerian fiscal and monetary policy framework suffers not so much from a
lack of technical design or expertise as from a general lack of commitment to good
governance. From what we have seen above of the-e xperience ofNigeria with fiscal and
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monetary policy, the two most important issues at the core ofhannonisation are:
-The size ofthe budget deficit
-The sources of deficit.finance.
Therefore, the most important element in the framework is federal government
commitment to good governance and the ohservance of agreed monetary targets in the
macro framework.
Aggregate credit target
Sub-ceilings on credit to government
This would imply reductien in the size of the budget either by reducing
expenditure or raising revenue
Federal Government should avoid inflationary financing that is the budget deficit
should not be financed by the banking system, especially the Central Bank
The corollary to this is that the preference should be for private sector financing.
Compulsory financing should be avoided by paying market rates.
•

•

The main framework for fiscal and monetary policy harmonisation should
continue to be the Monetary Survey where M 2 = NOA+ NFA
M2 = NCG+NCP+OAN+NFA
Monetary data are usually more reliable and more timely than fiscal data Monetary
expansion is Qften the basic problem, rather than the deficit itself The behaviour of
the fiscal deficit is monitored through the amount of credit expansion to the
government This credit expansion is broadly an indication ofthe monetary expamion

for which the public sector is responsible.
Nevertheless the macroeconomic policy framework can make do with some improvements.
•
The overall macroeconomic and sectoral planning efforts require better information.
Up-to-date, accurate and colllprehensi ve information on recent performance as
well as projections should be provided to FMF, NPC, CBN and the Line Ministries.
•
•

Projections need to be more realistic and internally consistent
Explicit spending limits should be indicated in the call circulars sent to the different
ministries soliciting their detailed expenditure for the next year.
There is need for better monitoring. Sectoral budgets should set measurable targets
in terms ofthe level and quality of services to be provided. The choice ofindividual
projects to include or eliminate from the budget should be informed not only by
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concern for affordability but also by the strategic role of.government.
The FMF should increase the frequency of its reviews from once a year to at least
four times a year.
The office ofthe Auditor General should audit all accounts. Each ministry should
•
make public their goals and progress made in meeting these goals.
Expenditure controls require a firm comrrutment to adhere to the approved budget.
•
Without this commitment from top to bottom, no system can be effective. The
existing system offinancial regulation is adequate ifproperly implemented. Authority
to incur expenditure by a political appointee, authorization of expenditure by the
Presidency and all off-budget accounts should be eliminated. New or stringent
penalties should be imposed on over-spending budgetary votes.
The Federal Governments financial regulations and audit functions are meant to
•
ensure internal accountability. The system has been weakened over the years.
There is need for determined effort to improve on transparency and accountability.
There are some institutional issues which should be resolved to improve the overall
framework for the harmonisation offiscal and monetary policy for the effective management
ofthe economy. In particular, the issue ofde-facto independence/autonomy to the CBN.

•

Central Bank Autonomy And Improved Economic Performance
The concept ofCentral Bank Independence (CBI) recognizes that the government
has ultimate responsibility for general economic policy - including monetary policy. Hence
CBI does not mean that the Central Bank be completely divorced from government, but
that it be "independent within government".
Arguments for Central Bank Independence
(i)
There is need to separate the currency issue arid lending functions ofthe Central
Bank from the financing and borrowing functions of government. Lack of CBI
may jeopardise the monetary policy function of the Central Bank.
(ii)
To insulate Central Bank monetary policy function from political pressure.
(1ii)
To improve policy transparency and credibility and hence achieve longer-run price
(iv)

stability.
Corollary to (iii) above- acceptance ofCBI by government backed by a mandate
for maintaining price stability is a demonstration ofthe strength ofgovernment' s
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(v)

commitment to policy hannonisation and more effective economic management.
CBI can enhance the quality of both monetary and general government policy
formulation and hannonisation.

Major features of Central Bank Independence
(I)
Statutory Objective: Independent Central Banks generally have
narrow and clearly defined mandate Or objective ofprice stability set for them by
statute.
(II)

(Ill)

Conflict Resolution: In the event of conflict between stated objective(s) and
other government or its own policy objectives, more independent Central Banks
have greater freedom to determine priority.

Monetary Policy Independence: Refers to the freedom to formulate and
implement monetary policy, especially to use policy instrwnents to achieve stated
inflation goal or target (instrument independence). A key component ofthis measure
ofCBI is the degree offreedom to change official interest rates, to select-exchange
rate under a floating system, and select the mix ofpolicy instruments and techniques
it uses to undertake OMO.
(IY)
Limitation on Financing Government Deficit: More independent Central Banks
are either precluded from financing government deficits or have strict limits imposed
on their ability to do so.
(V)
Appointment and Dismissal of Principal Officers: Appointment to independent
Central Banks may include non-government appointees or nominees:
•
Tem1s ofappointments are fairly long and scattered;
•
Dismissal is made difficult or precluded.
Budgetary Independence: Independent Central Banks have budgetary
(VI)
independence. An internally self-financing central bank is considered more
independent. I,css independent central banks have budgetary allo~ations or have
to present annual budgets lo government for approval.
We are aware that the degree of independence among Central Banks covers a
wide spectrum. l ,egislation may not cover every conceivable relationship between Central
Bank and government. The voids are filled by tradition at best and power politics at worst.
Therefore, actual independence may vary from legal independence because ofpersonalities
of key individuals in the bank and in the rest of government: thi: respect for the law with
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regards to observance oflegislation; the quality ofthe banks' advice as well as formal and
informal arrangements between the bank and other anns ofgovernment.
Evidence from both theory and practice leaves little doubt that the implementation
of market friendly monetary policy and policy co-ordination have little or no chance of
success without a substantial measure ofcentral bank independence: in particular; the
ability to use its policy instruments freely, and the specification ofa price stability goal or an
inflation target. It is no wonder, therefore, that a number of countries with poor rec0rds of
inflation e.g. Chile, Mexico, New Zealand and Venezuela, among others, have had the
legal independence oftheir central banks enhanced. Similarly, several countries in Eastern
Europe have recently made or are considering significant changes to their central bank's
legislation for the same purpose. More recently, the major industrial countries ofthe-European
Economic Community are on the move towards more independent central banks. In
particular, the Maastrich treaty requires national banks participating in the European System
of Central Banks to meet a prescribed standard of independence.
Therefore, the government should be responsible for determining and ~etting
monetary policy goals.
The goal(s) should be clearly-defined to include the achievement and maintenance
ofpriCtj stability (this should be understood to mean 1 to 3 percent average inflation
rate or a long-term target of say 2 percent).
Conflicting goals should be avoided e.g. price stability may conflict with objectives
offull employment, econo1nic growth, balance ofpayments etc.
In turn the central bank should be granted instrument independence i.e. ability to
design and implement monetary policy freely and using all the instruments at its
disposal to achieve the goal or target set for it.
'The central bank should be accountable by being held responsible for meeting its
goals or target.
In this regard, the Central Bank should publicly announce its immediate policy
goals e.g. inflation rate for the next three years after consultation with appropriate anns of
government, such as those responsible for Finance, planning and Economic Development.
The Governor should be required to explaiI! and justify the bank's policy in meeting
its pronounced goal in public, preferably to a selected group of well informed elected
officials. The testimony should be ,accompanied by the publication of a report. This is

.-
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similar to the Humphery Hawkins hearing at which the Chairman ofthe Federal Reserve
Board testifies twice a year before the United States Senate.
The function and responsibility ofthe Board ofDirectors and the Executive Board
should be clearly stated to show that monetary policy is their primary responsibility. Such
Directors and Board members should be selected from persons of recognized standing,
and professional experience in monetary, financial and economic matters. Board member
should be appointed for a lengthy term, more than 5 years, say 8-10 years. The terms of
appointment should be staggered to make for continuity.
The central bank should not be required to finance the government deficit and
should not manage the public debt.
The functions ofthe central bank should be defined to include the promotion of a
stable financial system through the traditional roles oflender oflast resort, banking licensing,
prudential supervision and regulation etc. Even where some of these functions (e.g.
supervision and regulations) are delegated to other agencies, the central bank should either
have concurrent authority or considerable input. The central bank should not have
responsibility or deposit insurance.
Finally, the central bank should enjoy budgetary independence, and its annual
budget should not be subject to government or ministerial approval.
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